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TORTS
Wex S. Malone*
LIABILITY To TRESPASSERS

Under ordinary circumstances trespassers and gratuitious
licensees upon private property are entitled to very little by way
of a duty of care owed them by the owner or occupier. The adult
trespasser or tolerated intruder takes the property as he finds
it, and he can recover only where some new danger has been
interjected on the land with knowledge of the imminent likelihood of his presence and the new peril is one that even an alert
trespasser could not discover for himself.' The gratuitous licensee
who is permitted to come upon the property for his own purposes
can expect very little more than the trespasser. Since he has permission to enter, his presence cannot be wholly ignored, and he
should be warned of special dangers of which the occupier has
actual knowledge and which he realizes that even an alert licensee could not discover for himself. 2 But apart from this situation (commonly called a "trap") the licensee fares no better
than the trespasser or tolerated intruder insofar as the condition of the land is concerned.
In view of the above, it is surprising that the legislature
should have felt it necessary to enact a special statute in order
to protect landowners and occupiers against claims by licensees
or intruders who enter their property for "hunting, fishing,
camping, hiking, sightseeing or boating."8 The statute is ex*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See generally, PROSSER, TORTS § 58 (3d ed. 1964). The Louisiana position,
which is basically in accord with other jurisdictions, is discussed in Comment,
18 LA. L. REv. 716, 723 (1958).
2. PROSSER, TORTS § 60 (3d ed. 1964); Taylor v. Baton Rouge Sash and
Door Works, 68 So. 2d 159 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953) ; Vargas v. Blue Seal Bottling Works, 12 La. App. 652, 126 So. 707 (Orl. Cir. 1930).
3. La. Acts 1964, No. 248, LA. R.S. 9:2791 (Supp. 1964). The entire text is
as follows:
"A. An owner, lessee, or occupant of premises owes no duty of care to keep
such premises safe for entry or use by others for hunting, fishing, camping, hiking, sightseeing or boating or to give warning of any hazardous conditions, use of,
structure or activities on such premises to persons entering for such purposes.
If such an owner, lessee or occupant give permission to another to enter the
premises for such recreational purposes he does not thereby extend any assurance
that the premises are safe for such purposes or constitute the person to whom
permission is granted one to whom a duty of care is owed, or assume responsibil-
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plicit in stating that the landowner does not extend any assurance to such entrants that the premises are safe for them. In
answer, it can be said that at no time did he ever do so, even
before the enactment of the statute. The statute again provides that the landowner owes no "duty of care" to such persons. Again, it can be replied that at no time has he ever owed
any duty, except as suggested in the preceding paragraph. If
the landowner should set traps for the trespasser or if, acting
in conscious indifference toward his safety, he should put some
new and hidden peril in the trespasser's way, the statute contemplates that the landowner should be liable as before, for it
expressly preserves liability for "deliberate, wilful and malicious injury."'4 Thus the statute seems to offer little, if any,
additional protection even for the class of landowners in whose
favor it was enacted.
The statute, however, can be a source of considerable confusion. It appears to make the purpose for which the licensee
or trespasser entered a matter of importance and suggests that
campers, hunters, fishermen, and the like are to be treated differently in some way from other intruders and bare permittees.
Yet, we do not know how, or why.
Again, the statute introduces confusion by specifying "hiking and sightseeing" as activities within its special coverage,
and, most important, it draws no distinction between adult and
infant trespassers. Is a child who wanders into the property
of an industrial establishment to satisfy his curiosity or his instinct for play to be regarded as a "sightseer" or "hiker," and
does the legislature intend thus to abolish or modify the widely
accepted Attractive Nuisance Doctrine? No one can seriously
believe that the legislature had any such intention, but the statute invites the argument and faces the courts with the necessity
of drawing more specious distinctions in an area of law that is
just emerging from a state of confusion in Louisiana.
ity for or incur liability for any injury to persons or property caused by any act

of person to whom permission is granted.
"B. This Section does not exclude any liability which would otherwise exist
for deliberate and willful or malicious injury to persons or property, nor does
it create any liability where such liability does not now exist. Furthermore the
provisions of this Section shall not apply when the premises are used principally
for a commercial, recreational enterprise for profit; existing law governing such
use is not changed by this Section.
"C. The word 'premises' as used in this Section includes lands, roads, waters,
water courses, private ways and buildings, structures, machinery or equipment
thereon."
4. Id. at subsection B.
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The statute refers broadly to an absence of a "duty of care
to keep the premises safe for entry." Presumably the measure
refers only to the physical condition of the land and does not
purport to grant any immunity to the landowner with reference
to the activities in which he may engage in the presence of trespassers or licensees. But again, the act invites the argument
that a carelessly conducted activity is merely one aspect of the
maintenance of unsafe premises, and that the legislature intended an immunity here also. If so, the jurisprudence of Louisiana
will have received a serious setback.
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS

The so-called "Good Samaritan Law" recently enacted by the
legislature provides in substance that a licensed physician, surgeon, or nurse who "in good faith gratuitously renders emergency care or services at the scene of an emergency" shall not
be held liable for civil damages "as a result of any act or omission in rendering such services." 5 It is difficult to understand
why such legislation was needed. Present tort law, without the
aid of the statute, makes abundant provision for the protection
of the physician who undertakes to render medical assistance
to an unconscious patient in an emergency. Under such circumstances the physician or surgeon need only exercise his best
judgment and show that he was medically qualified.6 The circumstance that he was called upon to act in an emergency is
taken abundantly into consideration in determining the reasonableness of his conduct. Certainly this is true with respect to
the professional judgment that he is called upon to exercise. As
to matters of mechanical skill the emergency character of his
conduct is still a factor to be heavily weighed in his favor. The
speed with which he must act, the possible unavailability of
proper materials and equipment are all matters entitled to serious consideration. But should he still not be required to exercise
average professional care and competence within these limitations? The statute seems to confer a broadside immunity upon
the physician acting in an emergency, and it is submitted that
it goes too far. The statute purports to shield only the physician
who renders emergency services "gratuitously," suggesting that
the lucky patient who gets services free of charge should grate5. La. Acts 1964, No. 46.
6. See, for example, Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912)
Wheeler v. Barker, 92 Cal. App. 2d 776, 208 P.2d 68 (1949).
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fully accept whatever is dished out to him. This, of course, does
not accord with general principles of law.
Where the patient is conscious or his parents are present or
readily available so that consent can be secured, a physician
who arbitrarily relies upon the existence of an emergency situation and ignores the wishes of the patient or parent has always
been, and should be, subject to liability for arrogantly insisting
that "doctor knows best" in the face of his patient's protest or
the protest of the family.7 It is difficult to justify a statute that
would sanction conduct of this kind and it is to be hoped that
the Louisiana courts will not so interpret it.
NUISANCE

The creation of the Louisiana Air Control Commission s
marks a step forward in the protection of the health of Louisiana citizens against pollution. It is enough to observe here that
the statute vests the commission with power to make findings
of fact with reference to air pollution and, within prescribed
limitations, to issue orders and to enforce the same through the
application for an injunction to be brought by the Attorney
General.
We are concerned here solely with the possible effect of the
existence and activities of the commission upon presently existing rights of individuals to seek relief by way of injunction for
air pollution as a nuisance. At this point, two principles may
be borne in mind: first, that a public nuisance may ordinarily
be made the subject of an injunction by a private individual provided that he can show special damage to himself, distinct from
the invasion.of the public interest generally; second, there is a
principle which, although perhaps less securely settled elsewhere, seems to prevail in Louisiana, that an operation prohibited by positive law is to be regarded arbitrarily as a nuisance
to be abated by a private individual who suffers special injury
therefrom.9 Indeed, the Louisiana Supreme Court has gone so
far as to observe in State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald:
"The Legislature was not competent to take away from
an individual the constitutional right of action for an injury
7. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 62 (1934).
8. La. Acts 1964, No. 259, LA. R.S. 40:2201-2215 (Supp. 1964).
9. An excellent discussion will be found in Comment, 54 MIcH. L. REv. 266

(1955).
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suffered-in his person or property by reason of the violation
of a zoning ordinance and confer such right of action exclusively upon the municipal authorities.""'
The statute under consideration anticipates this type of
problem by providing that nothing in the act "shall be construed to prevent private actions to abate nuisances under existing, laws." 11 Furthermore, since many actionable nuisances involve only serious inconveniences, rather than appreciable in2
jury to human life, and are thus beyond the scope of the statute,'
no conflict between the statute and the law of nuisance would
exist where nothing more than inconvenience is involved. When
the alleged nuisance of air pollution threatens human health or
materially interferes with the use of property (and thus comes
within the purview of the commission), the legislature does
make clear that the right to institute a suit for private nuisance
still exists. But, the question remains: where the defendant is
charged with the maintenance of a private nuisance, what effect should be given the fact that the same conduct is also a
violation of a commission order or finding? The statute contains this pertinent provision: "The basis for proceedings or
other actions that shall result from violations of any rule or
regulation which shall be promulgated by the commission shall
inure solely to and shall be for the benefit of the people of the
state generally and it is not intended to create in any way new
rights or to enlarge eixsting rights or to abrogate existing
rights."' 13
Despite the broad dictum quoted above from the Dema Realty Co. case, it would appear that the legislature can empower a
commission to make determinations and orders concerning the
general health without conferring private rights upon individuals who, it is conceded, would have no claim to an injunction
apart from the conduct condemned by the commission.
The problem still remains as to what use, if any, an individual seeking an injunction for nuisance can place the findings of the commission concerning the conduct of the defendant. The statute provides that the conditions found by the commission "shall not create by reason thereof any presumption
10.
11.
12.
13.

168 La. 172, 179, 121 So. 613, 616 (1929).
LA. R.S. 40:2216 (Supp. 1964).
Id. 40:2202(c).
Id. 40:2215.

cert. den., 280 U.S. 556 (1929).
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of law or finding of fact which shall inure to or be for the benefit of any person other than the state.' 4 (Emphasis added.)
Although one can readily agree that the commission's conclusions should not create any presumption of law that a nuisance exists, yet it is difficult to understand why its findings
should not be admissible in evidence in a suit by an individual
for an injunction, subject to explanation and qualification, just
like any other body of scientific facts and data, to be available
to the court in exercising its judgment that a nuisance in fact
does, or does not, exist.
14. Ibid.

